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III. Securitization of Fringe Economy
Receivables –  A Lender’s Issue

SECURITIZATION OF ABERRANT CONTRACT RECEIVABLES
THOMAS E. PLANK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Companies that are in the business of originating or acquiring rights to 
payment for moneys lent, property sold, or services provided—
receivables—need funds to operate their businesses. These receivables can 
arise in two different situations. First, the receivables arise from loans of 
funds by the originator to the obligors, such as residential mortgage loans, 
commercial business loans, student loans, and other kinds of personal or 
business loans, which could include payday loans, title loans, and other 
“aberrant contract receivables.” In these cases, the originator needs funds to 
lend. Other receivables arise from the selling or leasing of goods or other 
property or from providing services on credit, such as automobile loans and 
leases, trade receivables, equipment loans and leases, and health care re-
ceivables. For these cases, the provider of the property or servicers needs 
funds (1) to repay funds borrowed to acquire the property sold or leased or 
to provide the services or (2) to acquire more property or to provide future 
services.
Originators can obtain funds from equity investors and typically must 
do so to begin business.1 At some point, however, the higher cost of equity 
investment will cause originators to turn to other sources of financing. One 
traditional source of financing is a simple whole loan sale of batches of the 
receivables to another financial institution.2
*Joel A. Katz Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. A.B. 1968, 
Princeton University; J.D. 1974, University of Maryland. I have benefitted both professionally and 
financially serving as issuer’s counsel and bankruptcy counsel for securitization of mortgage loans and 
other consumer and business receivables, first as a partner with Kutak Rock LLP from 1987 to 1994, 
and then as a consultant for law firms on securitizations. The views expressed in this article are my 
personal views informed by my practice experience as well as my research and analysis of the issues 
and are not the views of any law firm for which I serve or have served as a consultant.
1. See generally WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND 
FINANCE 5-11, 237-38, 248-50, 282-84, 306-10, 338-41 (2004) (describing the difference between 
equity and debt, the different types of debt, and the factors that a company will consider in deciding to 
issue equity or debt).
2. See, e.g., NetBank, FSB v. Kipperman (In re Commercial Money Center, Inc.), 350 B.R. 465 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a purported sale by Commercial Money Center, Inc.—which leased 
equipment to lessees with sub-prime credit, packaged groups of leases together, and assigned its con-
tractual rights to future lease payments to financial entities, including NetBank, FSB—of a pool of 
future lease payments to NetBank pursuant to a sale and servicing agreement constituted a grant of a 
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Dealers that sell property in exchange for receivables will typically 
sell their receivables to financial companies that dictate the terms of the 
receivables. These financial companies are also referred to as originators, 
and this process is known as the indirect origination of receivables.3 An-
other traditional source of financing is borrowing from another financial 
institution, typically by granting to the lender a security interest to secure 
the loan.4 A more recent source of financing receivables is securitization 
and structured finance.
For mortgage loan receivables, securitization primarily5 involves the 
sale of the mortgage loans to a trustee to be held in trust and the issuance of 
pass-through certificates that are then sold into the capital markets, often 
with a rating. The pass-through certificates evidence the beneficial interests 
in, but not the legal title to, the underlying mortgage loans, and the certifi-
cate holders are entitled to all of the cash flow from the mortgage loans. 
For non-mortgage loan receivables, securitization and structured finance
primarily combine the two traditional forms of receivables financing: (1) 
traditional accounts receivables financing in which the lender takes a secu-
rity interest in receivables and the borrower retains liability for default, and 
(2) factoring, in which the purchaser of receivables assumes the risk of loss 
from default by the obligors.6 In a securitization or structured finance 
transaction, the owner of the receivables sells them to a separate legal per-
son, typically a wholly owned subsidiary, that is intended to be a bankrupt-
cy remote special purpose entity (an “SPE”). In a securitization, the SPE 
issues debt securities, often rated by a rating agency, and in a structured 
security interest and not a true sale of the lease payments); Bear v. Coben (In re Golden Plan of Cal.,
Inc.), 829 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding sale of residential mortgage loans and interests in such 
loans to investors by Golden Plan of California, a mortgage loan broker).
3. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, ABS: GENERAL METHODOLOGY AND 
ASSUMPTIONS FOR RATING U.S. AUTO LOAN SECURITIZATIONS, ¶ 13 (Jan. 11, 2011, republished Jan. 5, 
2012) [hereinafter, S&P AUTO LOAN CRITERIA] (“Most auto financings are indirect auto loans, which 
means that the auto dealer helped to secure financing for the buyer. Direct auto loans are those in which 
the consumer obtained the loan directly from a financial institution.”).
4. See, e.g., Funding Sys. Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Chem. Bus. Credit Corp. (In re Funding Sys. 
Asset Mgmt. Corp.), 111 B.R. 500 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (addressing the extent to which a secured 
creditor had perfected its security interest in chattel paper in the form of equipment leases originated by 
a lease financing company).
5. Non-mortgage receivables, such as automobile loans, have been securitized by the issuance of 
pass-through certificates, and mortgage loan securitizations and structured finance transactions have 
used special purpose entity (“SPE”) borrowers. Nevertheless, because of the differences between the 
two kinds of receivables, the vast majority of mortgage and non-mortgage loan securitizations have 
followed the pattern described in the text.
6. See Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and Chattel Paper 
Under the U.C.C. and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 CONN. L. REV.
397, 406–12 (1994) (describing the history of financing for accounts receivable before the enactment of 
Article 9 of the U.C.C.).
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finance transaction, the SPE borrows from a lender. In both cases, the SPE 
borrower grants a security interest in the receivables to secure the debt 
securities or the loan, which is primarily payable from the receivables. 
Accordingly, from a structuring perspective, there is no significant differ-
ence between a securitization and a structured finance transaction.
Originators of receivables use securitization and structured finance 
debt transactions when they produce lower financing costs and greater ben-
efits than sales or traditional lending. Although securitization and struc-
tured finance debt transactions are more complicated and entail greater 
structuring and operational costs, in many cases they result in lower overall 
financing costs and provide the originators with a greater return than whole 
loan sales or traditional lending.7 These cost savings arise primarily from 
the reduced risks to the lenders and investors, which I will also call lenders, 
that hold debt obligations of the SPE borrower. The reduced risks result 
from the separation of the risk associated with the receivables, which the 
lenders in a debt securitization/structured finance transaction bear and 
which they can more easily assess, from all of the other risks facing an 
originator that is an operating company, which are more difficult and more 
costly to assess.
In the case of a sale of receivables, the originator transfers to the buyer 
all of the benefits and burdens of ownership. If the receivables produce any 
surplus over the purchase price, the buyer, not the seller, realizes the bene-
fit of the surplus. In the case of a traditional secured loan, the originator as
borrower retains the full benefits of ownership of the receivables, but the 
borrower must compensate the lender for two different risks that the lender 
faces. First, the lender as well as the owner takes the risk that the receiva-
bles themselves will not perform as well as expected and as well as neces-
sary to repay the loan. This risk includes not only the risk of non-payment 
by the obligors, but also the risk of loss if the market value of the receiva-
bles declines to less than the amount owed on the loan.
Second, even if the receivables themselves perform well enough to re-
pay the loan, there is a risk that the owner/borrower encounters financial 
difficulties for reasons not related to the receivables. These reasons could 
include poor performance on another batch of receivables securing a differ-
ent loan; poor performance of other business operations, such as servicing, 
that give rise to creditors who are not paid; and the risk of tort liability for 
7. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture: Protecting Inves-
tors in Securitization Transactions; Does Dodd-frank Help, or Hurt?, 72 LA. L. REV. 591, 591-92, n.1 
(2012) [hereinafter, Schwarcz, Securitization and Dodd-Frank]; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Roberta 
Mitchell Lecture: Structuring Responsibility in Securitization Transactions, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 
806-07 (2012); see also infra note 27 and accompanying text.
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any kind of tort that the operating company could commit. If the own-
er/borrower gets into financial difficulties or creditors take actions to col-
lect debts owed to them, an owner/borrower has an incentive to file a 
voluntary petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code.8 In addition, the 
borrower could become subject to an involuntary petition filed by unse-
cured creditors.9
As discussed in Part II below, the commencement of a bankruptcy 
case by or against the owner/borrower subjects the secured lender to addi-
tional costs—what have been referred to as a “bankruptcy tax”10—and to 
cover those costs, the lenders must charge a higher interest rate—an in-
crease which I have elsewhere called a “bankruptcy premium.”11 Securiti-
zations and structured finance transactions avoid the bankruptcy tax that 
would otherwise be imposed on the secured lending transaction and the 
bankruptcy premium that lenders would have to charge to cover the bank-
ruptcy tax arising out of the risk of bankruptcy for reasons not related to the 
receivables.
Securitizations and structured finance transactions do not avoid the 
bankruptcy tax altogether. To the extent that the receivables themselves do 
not perform, and the lender seeks to foreclose its security interest in the 
receivables held by the SPE borrower, the SPE borrower will have a reason 
to commence a bankruptcy case. Nevertheless, for traditional receivables, it 
is generally much easier to assess the credit quality of a pool of receivables 
and the risk of bankruptcy because of poor performance of the receivables
than to assess the credit quality of an operating company.12 Securitizations 
and structured finance transactions are cost-effective when the risk associ-
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012) (providing for the commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case).
10. See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1055, 1064 (1998).
11. See Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1655, 1660-71 (2004) [hereinafter Plank, Security of Securitization].
12. See, e.g., S&P AUTO LOAN CRITERIA, supra note 3, ¶¶ 6,15:
Standard & Poor’s methodology for rating and monitoring auto lease ABS securitizations 
consists of a review of collateral characteristics, static pool and portfolio performance, third-
party forecasts of residual values, historical auction data, current used vehicle market values, 
and transaction structures. Based on this review, cash flow modeling parameters are estab-
lished for the purpose of modeling the transaction’s payment structure and analyzing the 
pool’s ability to pay timely interest and ultimate principal under stress scenarios that are con-
sistent with the assigned ratings. These criteria address the risks associated with the:
Credit quality of securitized assets;
Cash flow mechanics and payment structure;
Operational and administrative risk;
Counterparty risk; and
Legal and regulatory risk.
See also app. tbls.2-4 (presenting historical data on auto loan performance since 1925).
2014] SECURITIZATION OF ABERRANT CONTRACT RECEIVABLES 175
ated with the receivables is less than all of the other risks of an operating 
company.
The isolation of risk that produces the cost savings by a securitization 
and structured finance transaction requires structural features absent from 
the traditional secured loan. As described in Part III below, the structural 
features necessary to achieve this isolation of risks consists of two ele-
ments. First, the originator, which is generally an operating company, must 
transfer the receivables to an SPE borrower in a way that removes the re-
ceivables from the potential bankruptcy estate of the originator seller—
what is commonly referred to as a “true sale.” Second, the SPE borrower 
itself and the loan transaction to the SPE borrower must be structured to 
minimize the risk that the SPE borrower will become a debtor in bankrupt-
cy for reasons not related to the receivables. Both the debt incurred by the 
SPE to acquire the receivables and the SPE borrower itself must be “bank-
ruptcy remote.” The heart of these structural requirements is that the lender 
must look primarily to the receivables for repayment, and not to the origi-
nator or sponsor of the securitization or structured finance transaction.
Although securitization and structured finance have been used for a 
wide variety of receivables, it does not follow that a securitization or struc-
tured finance transaction is cost-effective or feasible for every type of re-
ceivable. The characteristics of each type of receivable and the different 
characteristics of the business model for financing receivables will dictate 
the cost-effectiveness or feasibility of a securitization or structure financed 
transaction for any particular receivable. As I discuss in Part IV below, the 
nature of aberrant contract receivables may present challenges to using 
securitization or structured finance as a form of financing. Determining the 
feasibility of securitization or structured finance for aberrant contract re-
ceivables requires detailed knowledge of these receivable. This article 
seeks only to identify the relevant issues for such a determination.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY TAX ON SECURED CREDIT
As the most recent codification of a body of law that first appeared in 
the sixteenth century, the Bankruptcy Code addresses the problem that 
exists in any credit economy of the borrower that has insufficient liquid 
assets to repay his, her, or its creditors.13 Under the Bankruptcy Code, a 
borrower can become a debtor in bankruptcy by filing a voluntary petition, 
which constitutes an “order for relief,” to liquidate its assets under Chapter 
13. See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV.
487 (1996) (describing the development of bankruptcy law in England and the United States).
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7, or to reorganize its affairs under Chapter 11.14 In a Chapter 7 liquidation, 
an independent trustee is appointed to liquidate the assets,15 and in a Chap-
ter 11 reorganization, the debtor becomes the “debtor in possession,” which 
continues to operate the business of the debtor and which has the powers of 
a bankruptcy trustee.16 Creditors can also initiate a bankruptcy case against 
the debtor by filing an involuntary petition, and the court will enter an or-
der of relief unless the petition is controverted, in which case the court will 
enter an order for relief only if the debtor is not paying its debts as they 
become due.17
The commencement of a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy case has 
the effect of accelerating all claims that creditors have against the debtor 
that arose before the commencement of the case.18 In addition, the filing of 
a petition automatically stays actions by creditors to collect their debts, 
including the commencement or continuation of litigation and enforcement 
of liens against property of the estate.19 Also, all unsecured and under-
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (2012) (providing that “debtor” means a “person or municipality 
concerning which a case under this title has been commenced”); § 109 (providing what types of an 
entity may be a debtor under the different chapters of the Bankruptcy Code); 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) 
(providing that a “voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the bank-
ruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under such chapter”); 
§ 301(b) (providing that the “commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of this title constitutes 
an order for relief under such chapter”).
15. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (2012) (providing for the appointment of an interim bankruptcy 
trustee and the election of the bankruptcy trustee); § 704 (providing for the duties of the trustee, includ-
ing the liquidation of property of the estate); § 725 (requiring the trustee to dispose of property in which 
a third party has an interest, such as a lien); § 726 (providing for distribution of property of the estate, 
including distributions to creditors).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2012) (providing that “debtor in possession” means the debtor unless 
an independent trustee is appointed); § 1107 (providing that the debtor in possession has substantially 
all of the powers of the trustee under Chapter 11); § 1108 (authorizing the trustee, which normally is the 
debtor in possession, to operate the debtor’s business).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012) (providing that an “involuntary case may be commenced only 
under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person, except a farmer, family farmer, or a corpo-
ration that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, that may be a debtor under the 
chapter under which such case is commenced”); § 303(b)-(c) (setting forth the requirements for an 
involuntary petition); § 303(h) (providing for the entry of the order for relief).
18. A creditor is an entity that has a claim that arose before the order of relief. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(10) (2012). Proof of creditors’ claims may be filed by creditors or the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 501 
(2012). Claims are allowed unless a party in interest objects. § 502(a). If an objection is made, section 
502(b) provides that the bankruptcy court “after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of 
such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall 
allow such claim in such amount” with certain exceptions not relevant to this discussion. § 502(b). The 
court must estimate certain contingent and unliquidated claims. § 502(c).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). This subsection provides that the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a 
judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could 
have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
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secured creditors do not accrue interest on their claims after the com-
mencement of the case.20 These provisions impose costs on unsecured 
creditors. They are nevertheless necessary for the efficient liquidation of 
the debtor’s assets for distribution to the debtor’s unsecured creditors or 
reorganization of the debtor’s affairs for the benefit of the unsecured credi-
tors.
These provisions also apply to creditors that have a security interest in 
assets owned by the debtor.21 In addition to the costs imposed by accelera-
tion and the automatic stay, secured creditors are subject to other risks. 
These include: (1) the risk that a bankruptcy court would allow the bank-
ruptcy trustee to substitute other collateral for the collateral that the secured 
creditor bargained for, so long as the court determines that the creditor is 
“adequately protected,”22 and (2) the risk that the bankruptcy court would 
subordinate the secured creditor’s claim to the security interest of a debtor-
in-possession lender, again so long as the court determines that the creditor 
is “adequately protected.”23
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment ob-
tained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to 
exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent 
that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case 
under this title against any claim against the debtor.
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (providing for a determination by the court of the amount of the 
claim allowed “except to the extent that . . . such claim is for unmatured interest”); United Sav. Ass’n of 
Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 370-371 (1988) (holding that an undersecured 
creditor is not entitled to receive interest to compensate the creditor for the delay of foreclosure caused 
by the bankruptcy case). Note that oversecured creditors are allowed to accrue interest. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 506(b).
21. In my view, the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of secured creditors is less than ideal not only 
for the financing of receivables. See Thomas E. Plank, The Creditor in Possession under the Bankrupt-
cy Code: History, Text, and Policy, 59 MD. L. REV. 253, 263-68, 336-49 (2000) (discussing the bank-
ruptcy law history of the expanded jurisdiction over secured creditors and the policy reasons for 
limiting a creditor in possession of collateral obligation to return collateral).
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2012) (providing that adequate protection of an entity’s interest may be 
provided by “an additional or replacement lien to the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant 
results in a decrease in the value of such entity’s interest in such property”); § 363(b)-(c), (f) (providing 
that the bankruptcy trustee may use, sell, or lease property of the estate or sell property in which the 
estate has an interest under certain conditions); § 363(e) (providing that, “on request of an entity that 
has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, 
the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to 
provide adequate protection of such interest”).
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1) (providing that the bankruptcy court may: “authorize the obtaining 
of credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is sub-
ject to a lien only if (A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and (B) there is adequate 
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Nevertheless, for certain types of assets and certain types of creditors, 
the immediate acceleration of claims and the automatic stay may be desira-
ble. In the case of a debtor that operates tangible assets, like real estate and 
equipment, and finances those operations with loans secured by such as-
sets, the acceleration of the secured claims and the imposition of the auto-
matic stay may, in my view, be more efficient than allowing the secured 
creditors to enforce their security interests, which bankruptcy law had al-
lowed until the 1930s. In the case of a liquidation, if the debtor has equity 
in the collateral, the bankruptcy trustee has a greater incentive and greater 
ability to maximize the value of the collateral than a secured creditor, 
which after all cannot realize any increase in that value above its secured 
claim. In the case of a feasible reorganization of, say, a trucking company 
or an airline, the reorganization cannot proceed if the secured creditors can 
foreclose on the trucks or airplanes that secure their debt. Hence, the in-
creased costs imposed on these secured lenders by such acceleration and 
the automatic stay may be justified by a greater return for the secured credi-
tors and unsecured creditors of the debtor.
The very existence of securitization, however, demonstrates that the 
increased costs from the acceleration of secured claims, the imposition of 
the automatic stay, and the other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code dis-
cussed above, impose costs for secured lenders to originators of receivables 
without significant benefit to the debtor or its other creditors.24 For exam-
ple, the costs imposed by the immediate acceleration of secured claims 
explains why it is not feasible for an operating finance company that would 
be subject to the Bankruptcy Code to finance the origination of long term 
mortgage loans by issuing debt secured by mortgage loans.25 It is no acci-
dent that, since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code effective in 1979, 
more than eighty-nine percent of all mortgage loans have been held by 
entities (1) that are not subject to the Bankruptcy Code or (2) that are bank-
ruptcy remote issuers of asset-backed securities.26
protection of the interest of the holder of the lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or 
equal lien is proposed to be granted.”).
24. See Thomas E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in Securitization: A Prudent Legal Structure and a 
Fanciful Critique, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 629-32 (2008) (explaining why the Bankruptcy Code 
limitations on secured creditors with a security interest in receivables owned by an originator produce 
essentially no benefit to the other creditors of the originator).
25. See Thomas E. Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market: The Nature of the Mortgage 
Loan and Regulatory Reform, 12 TENN. J. BUS. LAW 135, 137-45 (2011) (describing the development 
of mortgage finance, including public and private securitization, from 1945 to 2009, and explaining 
why the nature of mortgage loans requires protection from acceleration of debt secured by long-term 
mortgage loans).
26. See id. at 144-45, n.42.
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For shorter-term receivables, the costs of acceleration are not as sig-
nificant, but the automatic stay and the other provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code affecting secured creditors remain significant. A study done in 1988 
provides one example of the cost savings from the securitization of auto-
mobile loans.27 This study compared the costs and benefits of $4 billion in 
asset-backed securities (“ABS”) backed by automobile loans originated by 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”) with the costs and 
benefits of GMAC’s publicly issued corporate debt. The costs, all ex-
pressed as an annual percentage of outstanding balance, are set forth be-
low:28




Principal amount $18 billion $4 billion
Interest rate 7.01% 6.91% 
Fees 0.20% 0.26% 
Loss reserve/credit enhancement 0.50% 0.52%
Net cost of capital 1.28% 0.00%
Total 8.99% 7.69%
Net difference 1.30%
Although the slightly higher rating of the ABS—a AAA rating—
produced a cost savings of 0.10 percentage points, or 10 basis points, over 
the corporate debt, which carried a AA+ rating, almost all of those savings 
were eaten up by the higher transaction costs—6 basis points—and loss 
reserves or credit enhancement—2 basis points.29 The substantial cost sav-
ings derive from the costs of net capital—128 basis points—that GMAC 
had to maintain to achieve a AA+ rating on its corporate debt.30 Further, by 
comparing rated corporate securities and rated asset-backed securities, this 
study eliminates any cost savings attributable to the greater liquidity and 
investor demand of securities over ordinary secured loans.
Although securitization and structured finance transactions avoid the 
costs that the Bankruptcy Code imposes on secured creditors to operating 
companies, structuring the transactions to avoid such costs also entails 
additional costs. Part III describes the additional transactional requirements 
27. See James A. Rosenthal & Juan M. Ocampo, Analyzing the Economic Benefits of Securitized 
Credit, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32, 36 (Fall 1988).
28. Id. at 36-40.
29. Id. at 40-41.
30. Id.
180 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:1
to achieve bankruptcy remoteness. The question then remains whether ab-
errant contract receivables can satisfy the legal and credit-dependent re-
quirements for structured finance and securitization transactions.
III. SECURITIZATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE REQUIREMENTS
As discussed above, securitization and structured finance debt transac-
tions achieve bankruptcy remoteness by effecting a legal true sale of the 
receivables to a separate, bankruptcy remote legal entity, the SPE that is-
sues debt secured by the receivables. To ensure a structure that will likely 
be respected by a bankruptcy court, the transaction documents will impose 
significant limitations on the seller of the receivables, the SPE, and the 
lender. Specifically, unlike a typical corporate financing in which a parent 
of a borrower will also guarantee the debt of the subsidiary borrower, the 
lenders must look primarily to the receivables for repayment and not to the 
credit of the originator of the receivables. This limitation requires two dif-
ferent conditions: (1) reliable and predictable cash flow from the receiva-
bles, and (2) legal restrictions on the originator, the SPE, and the lenders.
A. The Nature of the Receivables
The value of any receivable depends on the willingness and ability of 
the obligor to pay the amounts that the obligor agrees to pay. Accordingly, 
determining the value of any receivable requires an examination of both the 
obligor’s financial condition and the specific characteristics of the receiva-
bles that affect the likelihood of timely payment of the receivable. For 
many different types of receivables, originators and lenders have developed 
criteria for predicting the likelihood of timely payment of principal and 
interest. Originators and lenders have also developed analyses to predict, 
over a pool of receivables, the percentage of receivables that will default 
and the amount that will likely be realized on defaulted receivables.31 The 
larger the number of receivables of similar types, the easier the determina-
tion of expected losses and the methods of covering those losses, including 
covering losses on defaulted receivables from the interest paid on perform-
ing receivables. For this reason, there is a large and functioning market for 
31. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Securitization and Dodd-Frank, supra note 7, at 591-92; see also
STANDARD & POOR’S CORP., STRUCTURED FINANCE CRITERIA 25-26 (1988) (providing a general 
description of Standard & Poor’s methodology in assessing the credit quality of a pool of receivables 
owed by unrated entities and remarking that its “‘asset loss’ model . . . is based on the belief that only 
pools of assets that can withstand potential adverse circumstances merit high quality credit ratings”).
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automobile loan securities backed by prime receivables and also by sub-
prime receivables that meet certain minimum criteria.32
The analysis does not depend solely on the credit rating of the obligor. 
Other characteristics of the receivables will affect cumulative net losses. 
For example, cumulative net losses for obligors with identical credit ratings 
were lower for auto loans secured by new cars compared to those secured 
by used cars, and for auto loans with a term of sixty months compared to 
those with a term of seventy-two months.33 In addition, other factors may 
affect a determination of the quality of a pool of automobile loans, such as 
origination and underwriting standards and credit/risk scoring tools; servic-
ing and collection policies; accounting policies; and dealer relationships 
and monitoring tools.34 Every lender must analyze all of these factors for 
each type of receivable in structuring a securitization or structured finance 
debt transaction secured by those receivables.
B. Legal Restrictions
As noted above, to achieve bankruptcy remoteness for the receivables, 
there must be (1) a true sale to (2) a bankruptcy remote SPE. To achieve 
these goals, the originator/seller, the SPE, and the lender must agree to 
limitations that do not arise in direct secured lending transactions.
1. True Sale
Intent. First, to achieve a true sale, the documents effecting the sale 
and the actions of the parties must express the intent that there be an abso-
lute assignment of the receivables to the SPE borrower.35 This requirement 
does not constrain the parties, but it does require careful attention. Origina-
tors look to securitization as a form of financing and as business people, 
may not be particularly interested in the legal terminology. They need to be 
educated about the fact that the first transfer is a sale.
Fair Market Value Purchase Price. The second requirement for a true 
sale is the receipt of fair market value by the seller for the receivables.36
32. See, e.g., S&P AUTO LOAN CRITERIA, supra note 3, ¶¶ 6, 15.
33. Id. at ¶ 29, tbl.2.
34. Id.
35. See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Key to Securitization: Isolating the Assets to Be Securit-
ized from the Risk of An Insolvency Proceeding, in OFFERINGS OF ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES
§ 8.03[B][1] (John Arnholz & Edward E. Gainor eds., 2d ed., 2013) (providing a detailed analysis of the 
elements of a true sale) [hereinafter Plank, Isolating Assets].
36. See generally Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhoff, Characterization of a Transfer of 
Receivables as a Sale or a Secured Loan upon Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181, 
207, 209-11 (1991); Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.03[B][2]; Plank, Security of Securitiza-
tion, supra note 11, at 1663.
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This requirement is not difficult to achieve. For example, assume a transfer 
of a $100 receivable to a newly formed subsidiary SPE that will borrow 
$75 from a lender. The seller will sell the receivable and receive $75 cash 
and the equity interest in the SPE, which is worth approximately $25.37
The consideration for subsequent sales may consist of cash from subse-
quent borrowings and the principal collected on the receivables already 
owned by the SPE, borrowings by the SPE from the seller under a subordi-
nated note, or the increase in the value of the SPE. For example, if the SPE 
owns receivables with a value of $1,000 previously transferred to it by the 
seller and has borrowed $750 from a lender, the seller has an equity interest 
in the SPE worth $250. The SPE could purchase another $100 in receiva-
bles, borrowing $75 from the lender and paying the other $25 in the form 
of collections from the existing receivables, borrowing $25 from the seller 
under a subordinated note, or simply recording an increase in the seller’s 
equity interest of $25.
Transfer of Benefits and Burdens of Ownership. The legal requirement 
that most constrains the seller, the SPE, and the lender is the rule that sub-
stantially all of the burdens and benefits of ownership of the receivables 
must be transferred from the seller to the SPE.38 The SPE buyer and the 
lender to the SPE must bear most of the risk of loss from credit default. A 
small amount of credit recourse to the seller for default by obligors is per-
mitted, limited either to ten percent of the receivables sold or the expected 
loss on the receivables.39 This limited recourse is not a major source of 
repayment, and in fact, it is intended primarily to create an incentive for the 
seller to sell good quality receivables to the SPE.
Also, if the market value of the receivables changes because of chang-
es in market interest rates, the SPE borrower and the lender must bear that 
risk.40 Generally, the seller may not guarantee that the borrower or the 
37. Steven O. Weise has pointed out to me that, because the holder of the equity interest in the 
SPE will be subordinate to other creditors of the SPE, the value of the equity would be slightly less than 
$25 if the value of the receivable held by the SPE remains $100. Of course, the SPE is not designed to 
have significant creditors but it may have a small amount of debt arising out of liability to service 
providers, such as lawyers and accountants. On the other hand, in my experience, the value of the equity 
in the SPE—because of the lower costs of securitization—will often be more than the difference be-
tween the market value of the receivable held by the originator for sale as a whole loan and the amount 
of the SPE’s debt. In other words, the value of the equity could be worth $26 or $27 dollars.
38. See generally Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.03[B][2]; Plank, Security of Securiti-
zation, supra note 11, at 1675; Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14
GEO MASON L. REV. 287, 333-34 (1991).
39. Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.03[B][2]. Another exception is full recourse to the 
seller for early payment default, that is, when the obligor fails to make a payment during the first month 
or three months after the sale. See id. § 8.03[B][3].
40. For example, a five-year $10,000 automobile loan payable monthly and bearing interest at 6% 
annually would have a present value of $9,534.63, a 4.65% decline, if rates on comparable loans sud-
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lender will receive a particular yield on the receivables or otherwise protect 
the SPE or the lender from a decrease in the market value of the receiva-
bles.41 On the other hand, the seller is generally prohibited from being able 
to repurchase the receivables at par to capture any increase in the market 
value of the receivables.42
One other characteristic of receivables is that they must be serviced.43
The advantage of receivables is that they turn into cash almost by them-
selves. I say “almost” become someone has to collect and process the pay-
ments on the receivables, account for the payments, and, when obligors 
become delinquent, attempt to collect from the obligors. This burden, simi-
lar to the burden of maintaining a car to keep it running, should be shifted 
to the buyer of the receivables. The seller is often retained as the agent for 
the buyer to service the loans because the seller has the familiarity with the 
obligors, and servicing is a good business that generates an income stream. 
Retention of the servicing is not inconsistent with a true sale so long as the 
buyer can replace the servicer for poor performance, the servicer has no 
liability for the performance of the receivables other than liability for its 
failure to service the loans properly, and the servicer earns a reasonable fee 
that adequately compensates it for its services.
2. Bankruptcy Remote SPE
The purpose of a bankruptcy remote SPE is to protect the lender from 
three different types of risks of bankruptcy: (1) the risk that the SPE will 
engage in activities other than owning the receivables and borrowing mon-
ey from the lender, and therefore become a debtor in bankruptcy as a result 
of those activities, that is, for reasons not related to the receivables them-
denly increase to 8%, and a present value of $10,497.53, a 4.98% increase, if such rates suddenly fall to 
10%. The longer the term of the receivable, such as a fixed rate 30-year mortgage loan, the greater the 
change in market value, even taking into account prepayments. For example, a 2% swing in interest 
rates on a 30-year mortgage loan could, depending on the assumed rate of prepayments, generate a 
decline in the present value of more than 10% or an increase of up to 6%. See Thomas E. Plank, Regu-
lation and Reform of the Mortgage Market and the Nature of Mortgage Loans: Lessons from Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 S.C. L. REV. 779, 790, tbl.4 (2009) (describing the range of the decline or 
increase in present value depending on the prepayment rates).
41. One exception is the requirement that if a seller has sold a receivable at a premium, say, 102% 
of the principal balance, and it pays off within a short period of time after the sale, say between three 
and six months (depending on the receivable), the seller may be required to refund to the buyer the 
premium that it received, that is, the 2%. See, e.g., FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE 
FAMILY 992 (Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/sel040913.pdf 
(discussing premium pricing recapture for mortgage loans that pay off within 120 days of the date of 
sale to Fannie Mae).
42. See generally Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.03[B][2][c] (also discussing permis-
sible types of repurchase options).
43. Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.03[B][2].
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selves (“Non-Asset Risk”); (2) the risk that a parent of the SPE will cause 
the SPE to file for bankruptcy to obtain some benefit for the parent (“Parent 
Opportunism Risk”); and (3) the risk that, if the parent of the SPE were to 
become a debtor in bankruptcy, a bankruptcy court will consolidate the 
assets and liabilities of the SPE with those of the parent under the doctrine 
of substantive consolidation (“Substantive Consolidation Risk”).44 To pro-
tect from these risks, the charter documents establishing the SPE and the 
other transaction documents will contain provisions that constrain the seller 
or parent of the SPE, the SPE itself, and the lender. These constraints create 
costs.45
To address the Non Asset Risk, the SPE charter will limit its activities 
to owning the receivables and borrowing from the lender.46 The major 
constraint here is that these limitations may prevent a legitimate expansion 
of the SPE’s activities. For example, if the SPE can only own automobile 
loans, then it may not be able to securitize automobile leases. This is a rela-
tively minor risk or cost.
To address the Parent Opportunism Risk, the SPE charter will require 
the SPE to engage a director, in the case of a corporation, or an independ-
ent manager, in the case of a limited liability company, or some other per-
son that is independent of the parent.47 The SPE charter will require the 
consent of the independent person to authorize the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition and certain other major actions, such as dissolution. Directors and 
managers appointed by the parent of the SPE who are officers, directors, or 
employees of the parent would be expected to follow the directions of the 
parent even if those directions were not necessarily in the best interest of 
the SPE, such as filing a bankruptcy petition when the SPE is solvent and 
paying its debts as they come due. An independent director or manager, 
however, is expected to consider the interests of the SPE, and to the extent 
legally possible, its creditors. Hence, if the SPE does not need to be a debt-
or in bankruptcy because it is not in default or otherwise insolvent in a cash 
flow or balance sheet sense, it is expected that the independent director or 
manager would not vote to authorize a bankruptcy filing simply because 
the filing may benefit the parent. This limitation does constrain the seller or 
parent of the SPE, and it also entails some cost.
44. See generally Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 11, at 1664-66.
45. See Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.04 (providing a detailed discussion of the 
requirements to satisfy these risks).
46. Id. § 8.04[A][2].
47. Id. § 8.04[A][1].
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Finally, to address Substantive Consolidation Risk, the SPE charter
will contain a set of separateness covenants that require the SPE to operate 
separately from the parent, to observe all legal formalities, and to segregate 
its assets, books, records, and bank accounts from those of the parent.48
Accordingly, even though the activities of the SPE are limited to owning 
and pledging assets, the SPE must incur the costs of a real separate legal 
entity. Further, the lender must primarily rely on the credit of the SPE and 
its assets.49 It cannot obtain a general guarantee from the parent, as is 
common in many ordinary corporate financings. At most, it may obtain 
only a very limited guarantee, generally not to exceed ten percent of the 
SPE’s debt or the amount of recourse allowed for a seller of the receivables 
if the seller is the parent.
IV. SECURITIZATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE FOR ABERRANT 
CONTRACT RECEIVABLES
The material in this Symposium presents a disturbing picture of some 
aberrant contracts, especially the ones that bear very high interest rates. On 
the other hand, people should have the freedom to enter into contracts of 
their choosing or, as is often the case, to accept or reject the contract terms 
that are available. Laws and regulations that help the market function better 
are desirable, but very often laws and regulations are a form of rent seeking 
that protects special interests, whether those special interests are business 
interests or bureaucratic and political interests. This article does not address 
the utility of these aberrant contracts. This article does suggest some issues 
and constraints on whether the rights to payments under these aberrant 
contracts—aberrant contract receivables—can be securitized. The utility of 
the securitization of aberrant contract receivables is different from the utili-
ty of the aberrant contracts themselves and the former should, in my view, 
be left to the decisions of the parties, which are commercial actors.
One of the key requirements for financing receivables through a secu-
ritization or structured finance transaction is the reliability and predictabil-
ity of the cash flow from the receivables.50 Some of the contracts 
considered to be aberrant contracts in this Symposium may produce cash 
flows of sufficient reliability and predictability for a securitization or struc-
tured finance transaction and others may not.
48. Id. § 8.04[B][1].
49. Id. § 8.04[B][2].
50. See supra Part III.A.
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In assessing the feasibility of financing aberrant contract receivables 
through a securitization or structured finance transaction, it is important to 
consider that, even for traditional receivables securitization and structured 
finance transactions are not the primary source for financing. For example, 
according to statistics published by the Federal Reserve Board, from the 
end of 1995 to the end of 2009, consumer credit grew from $1.2 trillion to 
$2.4 trillion.51 Of this amount, the balance held by United States depository 
institutions, other than credit unions, grew from about $542 million to $906 
million, with the percentage dropping from forty-six percent of the total at 
the end of 1995 to thirty-four percent at the end of 2002; it then increased 
slightly to thirty-eight percent and thirty-seven percent, respectively, at the 
end of 2008 and 2009.52
The balance held by issuers of asset backed securities (“ABS Issuers”) 
grew from $213 million at the end of 1995 to $625 million at the end of 
2007 and then declined to $575 million at the end of 2009; the percentage 
increased from eighteen percent of the total at the end of 1995 to a high of 
thirty-two percent at the end of 2002, and then declined to twenty-three 
percent at the end of 2009.53 During this time, the consumer receivables 
held by finance companies grew from $152 million at the end of 1995 to 
$572 million at the end of 2007, and then declined to $471 million at the 
end of 2009; the percentages ranged between twelve percent and twenty-
two percent during this period.54 These figures somewhat understate the 
amount of consumer finance receivables held by ABS Issuers because the 
Federal Reserve Board statistics for ABS Issuers only include those assets 
that are not consolidated on the books of their originators.55 Some finance 
51. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS;
HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES 2005-2012 98, tbl.222, l.2 (2013) [hereinafter FRB FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTS 2005-2012]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC 
ACCOUNTS; HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES 1995-2004 98, tbl.222, l.2 (June 3, 2013) [hereinafter FRB
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 1995-2004].
52. See FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 2005-2012, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.6; FRB FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTS 1995-2004, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.6. The percentage held by credit unions ranged 
between ten and eleven percent during this time. See FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 2005-2012, supra
note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.7; FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 1995-2004, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.7.
53. See FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 2005-2012, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.9; FRB FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTS 1995-2004, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.8.
54. See FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 2005-2012, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.10; FRB
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 1995-2004, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.9.
55. See FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE, G19 CONSUMER CREDIT MONTHLY SERIES, at 
n.8 (May 2013).
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companies did not treat the sale of receivables to their wholly owned SPEs 
as a “sale” for accounting purposes.56
Banks and finance companies use securitization and structured finance 
transactions as just one source and not the primary source of financing for 
traditional receivables. The choice to use securitization and structured fi-
nance transactions for these receivables depends on the relative costs and 
benefits of securitization and structured finance transactions versus the 
costs and benefits of other sources. If securitization or structured finance 
transactions for a particular type of receivables entail greater costs, those 
costs may overwhelm the savings achieved by avoiding the bankruptcy tax 
on direct secured lending to originators.
The nature of aberrant contract receivables and the restrictions de-
manded by the bankruptcy remote structure could prevent any meaningful 
use of securitization or structured finance for most types of aberrant con-
tracts. Securitization and structured finance transactions work for tradition-
al receivables because lenders can assess the credit quality of the receiva-
receivables largely independent of the activities of an operating company. 
An automobile loan turns into cash almost by itself. An item of inventory, 
such as a car on a dealer’s lot or an item of equipment like a truck owned 
by a trucking company, does not turn into cash by itself. It produces cash 
only because of the activities of an operating company, that is, a dealer that 
sells cars or a trucking company that uses trucks to transport goods.
To be sure, receivables must be serviced, and the value of a pool of 
receivables does depend to a certain extent on the quality of the servicing. 
56. Under the accounting standards in effect during the period from 1995 through 2009, including 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT 
OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 140: ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF 
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES (2000), available at http://www.fasb.org/
pdf/fas140.pdf, an originator that sold receivables to a wholly-owned subsidiary could obtain a sale for 
accounting purposes, that is, recognized a gain or loss on the transfer. In June 2009, the FASB issued 
two statements, effective for reporting periods that ended after November 30, 2009, which essentially 
required consolidation of the receivables owned by an SPE and the debt of the SPE with the assets and 
liabilities of an originator or affiliate that owned the SPE. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. OF 
THE FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 166:
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AN AMENDMENT OF FASB STATEMENT NO. 140
(2009); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. OF THE FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 167: AMENDMENTS TO FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46(R)
(2009).
I did not set forth any of the balances for 2010 or later. Because of this change in the accounting 
rules, most of the consumer receivables held by ABS Issuers are held on the books of their originating 
banks or finance companies, and the Federal Reserve Board does not include those in the assets of ABS 
Issuers. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., G19 CONSUMER CREDIT MONTHLY 
SERIES, at n.9 (May 2013). Accordingly, the Federal Reserve Board statistics for the years after 2010 
provide little meaningful information. For example, the balance of consumer receivables held by ABS 
Issuers declined from $573 million, or 23.69%, as of the end of 2009, to $50 million, or 1.99%, as of 
the end of 2010. See FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 2005-2012, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.8.
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This portion of the value of the receivables, however, is small in compari-
son to the value of the pool. If a servicer is servicing a pool poorly, the 
servicer can be replaced. Most securitization and structured finance trans-
actions, in my experience, absent poor performance of the receivables, have 
sufficient credit cushion to survive a poor servicer that must be replaced.
If the value of the pool of receivables, however, depends too much on 
the ongoing actions of the originator or servicer, a securitization or struc-
tured finance transaction may not be feasible. A few simple examples will 
illustrate the point.57
First, assume that an originator originates and holds a pool of good 
quality receivables that amortize monthly over a five-year period and bear 
interest at 6%. The interest rate is intended to cover expected defaults and 
the cost of servicing. Assume an annual default rate of 0.25% with no re-
coveries and a servicing fee of 1%. The remainder of the interest earned—
net interest of 4.75% in this example—is intended to cover the originator’s 
cost of funds, its operational costs of originating receivables, and profit. 
The assumed default rate would generate cumulative net losses of 0.67% of 
the original principal balance of the pool, and the total servicing fee paid 
would also equal 2.67% of the original principal balance of the pool and 
2.31% of the total principal and net interest collected, that is, interest net of 
defaults.58
The servicing burden inherent in the receivables is very small relative 
to the principal to be paid and the interest to be earned. If the originator 
transfers the receivables to a wholly owned SPE that borrows from a lend-
er, the lender can easily assess the credit quality of the receivables and the 
predictability and reliability of the cash flow from the receivables. In this 
case, the lender is relying almost exclusively—greater than 97%—on the 
willingness and the ability of the obligor on the receivables to pay, and the 
costs of and losses arising from replacing the originator, as a servicer, will 
also be relatively small. The SPE borrower will obtain the net benefit of a 
lower interest rate, against slightly higher costs, from the bankruptcy re-
mote structure, and as the owner of the SPE borrower, the originator will 
also receive that benefit.
Second, assume a pool of receivables of lower quality that amortize 
monthly over a five-year period and bear interest at an annual rate of 24%. 
Also assume an annual default rate of 3% with no recoveries and a servic-
57. I developed the following two examples by constructing cash flows in an Excel document.
The cash flows are available from the author and the Chicago-Kent Law Review.
58. Some of these numbers would be slightly smaller on a present value basis, that is, discounting 
the future values to the value as of the date of the origination of the pool.
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ing fee of 3%. The net interest would be 18%, which is necessary to cover 
the higher cost of funds and higher operational costs for an originator of 
these types of receivables.59 This default rate would generate cumulative 
net losses of 9.08% of the original pool balance, and the total servicing fee 
paid would also equal 9.08% of the original principal balance of the pool 
and 5.55% of the total principal and net interest collected, that is, interest 
less defaults. Although higher, the servicing burden inherent in the receiva-
bles is still less than 10% of the original principal balance of the pool to be 
paid and about 5.9% of total principal paid and net interest to be earned. In 
this case, the lender is still relying primarily—greater than 90%—on the 
willingness and the ability of the obligor on the receivables to pay.
Now assume a contract of $1,000 on which the originator induces the 
obligor to pay 300% interest over a one-year period and then at the end of 
the year the originator writes off the principal amount as a complete loss. 
This looks like an aberrant contract. Out of 300% interest collected 
($3,000), 100% ($1,000) covers the total loss of principal. Assume that the 
originator obtains funds from equity investors and must pay a 25% annual 
return out of the remaining 200% ($2,000). That still leaves 175% ($1,750) 
for the costs of servicing this particular loan and the other operating costs. 
The much higher costs for servicing and other operations, if they are legit-
imate, indicates that a lender willing to finance this type of receivable 
would necessarily need to rely more on the ability of the originator to ser-
vice the loan—including inducing the obligor to make the high interest 
payments—than on the willingness and ability of the obligor to pay.
Reliance on an operating company does not make a bankruptcy re-
mote structure irrelevant. A bankruptcy remote structure for operating 
companies will reduce some risks because of the separation of one set of 
operational risks from another set of operational risks. For example, single 
asset real estate financings often use a bankruptcy remote, special purpose 
financing structure.60 The entity that owns the real estate and borrows un-
der a real estate loan will be an SPE, whose charter contains separateness 
covenants and may require an independent director or manager. Law firms 
often provide an opinion that the SPE borrower would not be substantively 
consolidated with its direct and indirect parents, which may own many 
59. On the basis of my experience, a plausible breakdown of the costs would be about seven 
percent for interest costs, eight percent for operating expenses other than servicing, and about three 
percent for profit. These higher operating costs reflect a smaller pool balance as well as the nature of the 
receivables.
60. See generally STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, U.S. CMBS LEGAL AND STRUCTURED 
FINANCE CRITERIA (2003).
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other entities that own real estate projects.61 Lenders to a single asset real 
estate SPE need only assess the operating risks of that SPE and not the 
operating risks of other real estate projects owned by affiliates of the SPE. 
Nevertheless, the lender is lending against an entity that owns and operates 
a business and not against a large pool of receivables that will turn into 
cash with little effort by an operating company.
There are two examples of transactions that illustrate the limits of a 
bankruptcy remote structure: (1) attempts to securitize servicing fees and 
(2) so-called hybrid transactions. Servicing of receivables under a servicing 
agreement generates servicing fees. The right to receive the servicing fees 
is itself a receivable, an “account” under Article 9 of the U.C.C., which can 
be assigned.62 Accordingly, the right to receive servicing fees can be sold 
to an SPE that could borrow money from a lender.63 Servicing fee receiva-
bles fit neatly into the legal structure for a securitization or a structured 
finance transaction.
Nevertheless, the nature of servicing fee receivables precludes wide-
spread use of servicing fee receivables in structured finance and securitiza-
tion transactions. Servicing fees are earned by the performance of the 
servicer. If the servicer fails to perform under the servicing agreement, and 
either the servicing agreement is terminated or the servicer is terminated as 
servicer, the fees could end. Further, if the servicer that sells the servicing 
fees to the SPE becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee 
may reject the servicer’s obligation to service, which would terminate the 
right to receive the servicing fees.64 The bankruptcy trustee would reject 
the servicing agreement if the costs of servicing exceeded the servicing fee 
earned. Accordingly, a lender that would lend funds against servicing fee 
receivables as collateral necessarily must rely extensively on the continued 
performance of an operating company.
There are ways to mitigate the risks inherent in servicing fee receiva-
bles. To the extent that the servicing fees exceed the cost of servicing, the 
servicer could sell the right to receive excess servicing to an SPE. For ex-
ample, if the servicer is earning a servicing fee of 35 basis points, but the 
cost of servicing is 20 basis points, the servicer could sell the right to re-
61. Id. at 95, 105-09.
62. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2010) (defining an “account” as “a right to payment of a monetary 
obligation, whether or not earned by performance . . . (ii) for services rendered or to be rendered”).
63. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (providing that Article 9 of the U.C.C. applies to “(1) a transaction, 
regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract; [and] 
(3) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes”).
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012) (A bankruptcy trustee “may assume or reject any executory 
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”).
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ceive 10 basis points to an SPE that could obtain a loan secured by the 
excess servicing fee. In this case, the reliability of the cash flow from the 
excess servicing is enhanced because the lender to the SPE can rely on the 
servicer’s continued incentive to service the underlying loans well. Accord-
ingly, in my experience, although it is has been difficult to structure an 
absolute assignment of all the servicing fee receivables, assignments of 
excess servicing are common.
Another example of a transaction that illustrates the limits of a bank-
ruptcy remote structure is what Standard & Poor’s Rating Services calls a 
“hybrid” transaction that combines elements of both securitization and 
corporate finance.65 In a hybrid transaction, an SPE holds assets other than 
traditional receivables that are serviced or managed by a parent servicer in 
a way that generates funds to repay debt borrowed by the SPE.66 As Stand-
ard & Poor’s notes, however:
[T]he legal techniques used in a securitization generally cannot alone 
achieve complete isolation of the credit risk of the operating assets. The 
legal structure may not remove some uncertain cash flow characteristics 
of the securitized assets. Thus, Standard & Poor’s criteria for hybrid 
transactions recognize that, while the integrity of a particular transac-
tion’s legal structure should be established and maintained, the structure 
itself is unlikely to insulate completely the transaction from the more ac-
tive types of operational or servicing risk.67
The 2000 LTV Steel Company bankruptcy case provides a useful con-
trast between a typical securitization of receivables and a hybrid transac-
tion. Although LTV Steel had emerged from bankruptcy in 1993, it was 
able to sponsor a trade receivables securitization in 1994. In this transac-
tion, LTV Steel entered into a revolving sale agreement to sell accounts, 
representing the obligation of buyers of steel products to pay for those 
products within a specified time period, to an SPE. The SPE entered into a 
revolving credit agreement providing for the issuance of debt secured by 
the receivables. The debt obtained a rating of “AAA” from Standard & 
Poor’s Rating Services, the highest rating available.68
Four years later, LTV Steel also sponsored an “inventory securitiza-
tion.” In this transaction, LTV Steel entered into a revolving sale agreement 
to sell unfinished steel products, its inventory, to a separate SPE. This in-
ventory SPE entered into a revolving credit agreement providing for the 
65. See generally STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, LEGAL CRITERIA FOR U.S.
STRUCTURED FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 145 (2006).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). For an extended discussion 
of the LTV Steel transaction, see Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 11, at 1686-98.
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issuance of debt secured by the inventory. LTV Steel was hired as the ser-
vicer to process the inventory and sell finished steel products on behalf of 
the inventory SPE.
The debt issued by the inventory SPE obtained a rating of only “BBB” 
from Fitch Rating Services, which is the lowest rating that is considered an 
“investment grade” rating. Although the BBB rating for the inventory secu-
ritization was presumably higher than LTV’s corporate rating, which must 
therefore have been below investment grade, it was substantially lower than 
the AAA rating of the trade receivables securitization.69 Hence, a securiti-
zation structure provided some benefit for the inventory securitization. 
Nevertheless, because the lenders in the inventory securitization were still 
relying to a substantial degree on LTV’s manufacturing and selling opera-
tions, the benefit to the structure was significantly less than the benefits of 
the trade receivables securitization. This much lower benefit shows the 
limitations of a securitization or structured finance transaction for assets 
other than receivables that generate cash flow substantially by them-
selves.70
Structured finance and securitization transactions involving traditional 
receivables offer substantial financing savings because of (a) the nature of 
the receivables and (b) the bankruptcy remote requirements. In these trans-
actions, a pool of traditional receivables will produce reasonably predicta-
ble and reliable cash flows from many obligors, most of who are able and 
willing to pay the amounts they owe. Often the credit quality of the pool is 
greater than the credit quality of the originator. The risk of default is spread
among many obligors and, given a sufficiently large number of obligors, 
can be predicted. The bankruptcy remote requirements separate the risks 
associated with the receivables from all of the other risks associated with 
the originator of the receivables. A lender to an SPE holding these receiva-
bles relies almost entirely on the pool of receivables and not on any one 
particular operating company.
69. Around the time of this case, the four highest rating categories (AAA, AA, A, and BBB for 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, and Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa for Moody’s, for example) were generally 
considered “investment grade” securities. See Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 11, at 1661, 
n.16. The classification system has not changed. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, GUIDE TO CREDIT 
RATING ESSENTIALS 10-11 (2011) (describing “investment grade” ratings as AAA, AA, A, BBB [in-
cluding BBB-] and “speculative grade” ratings as BB, B, CCC, CC, C, and D).
70. In addition, when steel prices fell in 1999 and 2000, LTV filed for bankruptcy in December 
2000 and unsuccessfully attacked both the inventory securitization and the trade receivables securitiza-
tion to fund its reorganization. The very existence of the inventory securitization and the degree of 
reliance on the operational capacity of the servicer formed the basis for the ultimately unsuccessful 
attack on the trade receivables securitization. See Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 11, at 
1686-98.
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If, however, an SPE holds assets, whether receivables or other types, 
that produce cash flow primarily because of the activities of a single person 
or a few persons, such as an originator and a servicer, the bankruptcy re-
mote structure provides less practical benefit. Accordingly, if the cash flow 
from aberrant contract receivables depends too much on the ability of the 
originator to generate such cash flow and not enough on the ability and 
willingness of a sufficiently large pool of obligors to pay, financing such 
aberrant contract receivables through a securitization or structured finance 
transaction may not be possible or at least not cost effective.
Moreover, if a lender that makes a loan to an SPE secured by a pool of 
receivables owned by the SPE cannot rely primarily on the ability and will-
ingness of the obligors on the receivables to pay, that lender would seek
assurance of repayment from the originator or servicer in the form of credit 
recourse on the receivables or other guarantees of payment of the SPE’s 
debt. However, to the extent that the originator or servicer provided such 
assurance beyond the limited assurance permitted for a bankruptcy remote 
structure, the transaction would cease to be bankruptcy remote. The bene-
fits that a structured finance or securitization transaction offers by avoiding 
most of the bankruptcy tax on secured credit extended to the originator 
would be lost.
On the other hand, receivables that may be considered aberrant con-
tract receivables but that produce reasonably predictable and reliable cash 
flows from obligors willing and able to make the required payments with-
out too much reliance on the operations of the originator of those receiva-
bles may be financeable through a cost-effective structured finance or 
securitization transaction.
V. CONCLUSION
The feasibility of financing any particular pool of aberrant contract re-
ceivables through a structured finance or securitization transaction depends 
on an extensive analysis of each type of contract, each type of obligor, the 
nature of the cash flows, and the extent to which those cash flows depend 
on a single operating entity. The other articles in this Symposium will pro-
vide insight to such feasibility.

